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Abstract
Background: Maize is the most important staple food in Kenya; any reduction in production and yield therefore often
becomes a national food security concern. To address the challenge posed by the maize stem borer, the Insect
Resistant Maize for Africa (IRMA) agricultural biotechnology public-private partnership (PPP) project was launched in
1999. There were, however, pre-existing concerns regarding the use of genetic engineering in crop production and
skepticism about private sector involvement. The purpose of this case study was to understand the role of trust in the
IRMA partnership by identifying the challenges to, and practices for, building trust in the project.
Methods: Data were collected by conducting face-to-face, semi-structured interviews; reviewing publicly available
project documents; and direct observations. The data were analyzed to generate recurring and emergent themes
on how trust is understood and built among the partners in the IRMA project and between the project and the
community.
Results: Clear and continued communication with stakeholders is of paramount importance to building trust,
especially regarding competition among partners about project management positions; a lack of clarity on
ownership of intellectual property rights (IPRs); and the influence of anti-genetic modification (GM) organizations.
Awareness creation about IRMA’s anticipated products raised the end users’ expectations, which were unfulfilled
due to failure to deliver Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt)-based products, thereby leading to diminished trust between the
project and the community.
Conclusions: Four key issues have been identified from the results of the study. First, the inability to deliver the
intended products to the end user diminished stakeholders’ trust and interest in the project. Second, full and
honest disclosure of information by partners when entering into project agreements is crucial to ensuring progress
in a project. Third, engaging stakeholders and creating awareness immediately at the project’s inception
contributes to trust building. Fourth, public sector goodwill combined with private sector technology and skills are
necessary for a successful partnership. These findings may serve as a useful guide for building and fostering trust
among partners in other agbiotech PPPs in sub-Saharan Africa.
Background
Maize in Kenya
Maize is the most important staple food in Kenya with
approximately 28 million bags (2.5 million tonnes) pro-
duced annually while annual consumption is approxi-
mately 34 million bags (3.06 million tonnes) [1]. Over
75% of the maize in Kenya is produced by small-scale
farmers who have limited capacity to produce efficiently
and in sufficient amounts to meet the nation’s needs.
Kenya currently supplements its maize shortfalls by
importing from its neighboring countries—Uganda and
Tanzania—and other international sources [2]. One fac-
tor contributing to the shortfalls in maize production in
Kenya is attack by the maize stem borer insect pest,
which causes a yield loss of 13.5% [3]. The two most
important species of this pest are Buseola fusca and Chilo
partellas, both of which account for over 80% of the yield
loss [4]. Management of the maize stem borer in Kenya
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has been done mainly through the use of pesticides such
as Bulldock® (a synthetic pyrethroid) [5]. Managing the
incidence of the stem borer with pesticides, however, is
unaffordable and poses health and environmental risks to
small-scale farmers [6].
Another method tried for managing the stem borer in
Kenya has been the ‘Push and Pull’ cropping system devel-
oped by the International Centre of Insect Physiology and
Ecology (ICIPE) [7]. In this system, the “stem borers are
attracted to napier grass (Pennisetum purpureum), which
is used as a trap plant (pull), and are repelled from the
main cereal crop using a repellent legume intercrop
(push), desmodium (Desmodium spp.)” [7]. For further
up-scaling this system requires, among other needs, inte-
gration with livestock to utilize desmodium and capacity
building of the farmers on how to run the system, as well
as a more conducive policy framework—factors that may
have contributed to slow adoption of the technology by
farmers.
History of the Insect Resistant Maize for Africa (IRMA)
project
Based on the aforementioned challenges, the IRMA part-
nership was formed to develop conventional and trans-
genic maize varieties resistant to the stem borer. IRMA
technologies were expected to reduce farmers’ risks of
being exposed to pesticides while ensuring effective man-
agement of the pest. This would be achieved by transform-
ing farmer-preferred maize varieties using genes extracted
from a naturally occurring soil bacterium Bacillus thurin-
giensis (Bt) [8]. The project aimed to develop varieties
yielding 40% more maize for improved food security and
increased household income for maize-growing commu-
nities, first in Kenya and then in other African countries
[9].
The first efforts leading to the establishment of the
IRMA project were initiated before 1997 by members of
the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center
(CIMMYT) Board of Trustees. Cognizant of the maize
crop losses due to stem borer pests, as well as the difficul-
ties faced by small-scale farmers in managing the pests,
the Board requested CIMMYT to develop an African-wide
solution to the African maize stem borer. Financial sup-
port for the development of a Bt technology to manage
the stem borer was sought from the Novartis Foundation,
whose then Director, Dr. Klaus Leisinger, was also serving
as a member of the CIMMYT Board [9].
After a year of negotiations, Dr. Leisinger secured
funding from the Novartis Foundation. To avoid a possi-
ble conflict of interest, the Novartis Foundation ensured
that their funding was free of Novartis-owned technolo-
gies and contingent upon the use of traditional breeding
methods complementary to genetic modification (GM)
techniques [9].
In 1999, the IRMA project was launched in Kenya with
the Kenya Agricultural Research Institute (KARI) and
CIMMYT acting as the key implementing partners with
funding support from the Novartis Foundation (see Addi-
tional file 1 for short profiles of the IRMA project part-
ners). In 2000, the Novartis Foundation and AstraZeneca
merged their agribusinesses to form Syngenta [10]. In
2001, the Syngenta Foundation for Sustainable Agricul-
ture (SFSA) was established to replace the Novartis
Foundation, with Dr. Leisinger becoming the Acting
Executive Director. SFSA continued to fund the IRMA
project.
Additional partners, such as the University of Ottawa
and Monsanto Company, joined at various phases of the
project. The key collaborators (and their contributions)
included the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) for advisory
and public awareness, the Kenyan Plant Health Inspecto-
rate Services (KEPHIS) and National Council for Science
and Technology (NCST) for regulatory affairs, the
University of Ghent for training on regulatory and biosaf-
ety issues, and Agriculture Research for Development
(CIRAD) of France for synthesis of Bt events for the
development of IRMA maize lines. Others included the
Africa Biotechnology Stakeholders Forum (ABSF) for
communication and awareness creation, and the Rocke-
feller Foundation for funding.
The partners took up various responsibilities based on
their expertise and experience (see Additional file 2 for
more details on the partners’ responsibilities). KARI
hosted new IRMA GM technology testing sites, while
CIMMYT and SFSA were responsible for institutional
capacity building. The partners’ and collaborators’ efforts
at creating awareness among women and religious associa-
tions, consumer organizations, the private sector, various
government ministries and maize processors further con-
tributed to the achievement of the project’s objectives [11].
Project progress
The results achieved were linked to specific phases in the
project: IRMA I, IRMA II and IRMA III [12]. IRMA I
(1999-2003) was the proof of concept stage and focused
on infrastructure and personnel development. After five
years, the project had achieved:
• The development of source lines of the key Bt genes
Cry1Ab and Cry1Ba, which are effective against the tar-
get pests. Source lines are the base material needed to
transfer the Bt genes to target maize germplasm in
Kenya.
• The establishment of the necessary infrastructure
and training of staff in Kenya to allow for the safe hand-
ling of Bt maize.
• The identification of local germplasm containing
adequate levels of conventional stem borer resistance
[12].
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IRMA II (2004 to 2008) focused on delivering maize
germplasm containing conventional and Bt-based insect
resistance to Kenyan farmers [12] using the private-
sector event MON810 from Monsanto Company [8].
During this phase, the project developed and released
conventionally-bred insect-resistant, open-pollinated
varieties (OPVs) and hybrids adapted to Kenya’s agro-
ecological conditions [12] but failed to deliver Bt-based
insect-resistant varieties.
IRMA III (2009 to 2013), which is funded by the SFSA,
seeks to “share the benefits from IRMA II to the Eastern
and Southern Africa regions” [12]. This phase focuses on
developing and deploying conventional maize that is resis-
tant to field and storage insect pests [13]. Bt breeding,
which was initially planned [16], is no longer being
pursued in phase III.
Trust in agricultural biotechnology
It has been reported that distrust exists between the public
and private partners in agbiotech PPPs. The former views
the intentions of the latter with suspicion [14], which
often stems from the fear that multinational biotech com-
panies and western countries seek to take advantage of
poor nations [15]. The private sector, on the other hand, is
skeptical of the public sector’s capacity and willingness to
change [14]. As a result, competing interests may lead to
conflicts that are likely to diminish trust, and which have
been identified as an important element hindering the pro-
gress of effective PPPs [16]. There is, therefore, a need to
appropriately manage factors affecting the establishment,
development and maintenance of trust among the partners
in agbiotech PPPs to boost the chances of the projects’
success. This article presents a descriptive narrative of the
findings from our case study of IRMA, particularly as they
relate to the dynamics of trust building in agbiotech PPPs.
Methods
The IRMA project constitutes one of a larger series of
eight case studies investigating the role of trust in agbio-
tech PPPs in Africa. The purpose of this study was to
understand the role of trust in the IRMA partnership by:
• describing trust-building practices in the develop-
ment of the IRMA PPP project;
• describing the challenges associated with trust build-
ing in the partnership; and
• determining what makes these practices effective or
ineffective.
Data were collected by interviewing eight key informants
of the project; conducting a literature review of three rele-
vant project documents and five research articles specific
to IRMA; and conducting direct observations. We received
Research Ethics Board (REB) approval for conducting the
case study from the University Health Network (UHN),
University of Toronto before proceeding with the study.
Interviewees were identified first by making a list of key
individuals associated with the project based on the stake-
holders groups as identified in the research protocol. This
list was then populated further through snowball sampling
by engaging with stakeholder informants of the Sandra
Rotman Centre’s Social Audit Project [17]. Through this
process a total of 12 potential interviewees were invited
for the interview, eight of whom were interviewed. The
remaining four were unavailable for various reasons. The
potential interviewees were sent an invitation, which
included an explanation of the case study series, to partici-
pate in the interview. Those who consented to participate
were informed that the interview would be digitally
recorded, transcribed verbatim and then analyzed.
The interviewees included a farmer and executives
from the Cereal Growers Association of Kenya (CGA),
CIMMYT, KARI, Simlaw Seeds (SS) and SFSA.
The interviews were conducted in between 2009 and
2010 in Kenya and the United States – at the conveni-
ence of the interviewees. The interviews were held face-
to-face using a semi-structured interview guide and each
lasted approximately one and a half hours. The interview
guide included questions on the interviewees’ back-
ground, their understanding of the project, and their
interpretation of the word trust. The interviews further
explored the interviewees’ perceptions of trust among the
partners and with the public, apparent challenges to trust
building and observed trust-building practices. Finally,
interviewees were asked for their suggestions on how
trust in agbiotech PPPs can be improved (see Additional
file 3 for sample questions). Using the objectives as theo-
retical propositions, the data were analyzed by reading
through the transcripts and generating recurring and
emergent themes. The analysis was completed by review-
ing relevant project documents and research articles. All
the data were triangulated to create a comprehensive nar-
rative on how trust is understood and built among the
partners and with the community. The methods used in
this study were adapted from Yin 2003 [18].
Results and discussion
IRMA partners’ understanding of trust
In order to put into context informants’ views with regards
to trust, we asked the interviewees to provide their under-
standing of the word trust. Interviewees considered trust a
voluntary and cooperative effort that is achieved, main-
tained, or destroyed over time based on the perceptions of
those involved. Further, trust was thought to be motivated
by confidence in the abilities of other people or institu-
tions, agreements, and expectations of positive outcomes
based on partner responsibilities. Trust was also described
by interviewees to be of varying levels depending on an
individual’s knowledge of the project and the intended
project outcomes.
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Based on interviewees’ understanding of trust, and our
analysis of the challenges to and practices for trust build-
ing, we identified four key lessons that other agbiotech
PPPs may find useful for building trust among project
partners and with the community. The IRMA manage-
ment pointed out that they did not deliberately put in
place specific practices intended to build trust. Conducting
further studies on the effect of deliberate trust-building
practices on the success of an agbiotech PPP may there-
fore be of value. The four key lessons are:
1. Ensure product delivery
The commercialization of IRMA products was expected to
commence at the end of phase II of the project, with both
the transgenic and conventional products becoming avail-
able to the public. The interviewees indicated that there
were high expectations among the end users for the IRMA
products and particularly for the Bt-based maize varieties.
Access to the end products would continue to enhance
trust among the partners and with the community.
The community disheartened by failure to deliver Bt-based
maize varieties
By the end of phase II (ten years from the start of the pro-
ject), IRMA managed to release conventionally-bred,
insect-resistant OPVs and hybrids but failed to deliver the
Bt-based insect-resistant maize varieties due to challenges
related to ownership of IPRs (see lesson 2) of the Bt tech-
nologies. The high expectations among the end users were
captured in the views of a farmer interviewed who said
that even if the farmers did not have enough information
about the technology they would have been happy to
adopt the technology once Bt maize varieties came to the
market. The same sentiment was echoed by a seed com-
pany executive who said that seed companies would have
distributed the technology once it came to the market.
In spite of the project management’s efforts towards
delivering Bt products, skepticism about IRMA’s capability
to deliver ensued from the project’s failure to release the
Bt-based maize varieties. The community’s—particularly,
farmers’ and seed companies’—trust in the project, which
did not seem to deliver, was therefore undermined.
Concern among the partners about failure to deliver
The failure to deliver the Bt-based maize varieties was of
great concern among the partners. The project manage-
ment hoped that this problem would be addressed during
phase III of the project. However, this may not be realized
since phase III places emphasis on further development of
conventional varieties [13]. A KARI interviewee expressed
the uneasiness and frustration that pervaded the KARI
management and government, which had been involved
closely with the launch of the KARI Biotechnology Center,
where some trials of the Bt technology were conducted.
There were concerns among the partners that the project
would not deliver the expected biotechnology products
after all. The interviewee stated: I would not like to ima-
gine that [the] project will not come out with products.
Because people might not trust GM again in Kenya. We
observe that failure to deliver the Bt products was likely to
result in distrust among the partners and with the
community.
2. Disclose fully information on IPRs
Considering that agbiotech PPPs rely on technologies
protected by IPRs, there is a need for partners to be
clear at the start of the project about the ownership sta-
tus of the IPRs and the manner of their use in order to
foster trust among the partners.
Lack of clarity on the ownership of IPRs of the GM event
One of the most controversial aspects of the IRMA project
was perhaps the vagueness surrounding the ownership of
IPRs of the GM event. It has been reported that confiden-
tiality and non-disclosure agreements surrounding owner-
ship of IPRs often lead to much suspicion and, in turn,
distrust [14]. At the beginning of the project, the Bt genes
were sourced from the University of Ottawa based on “a
research purposes only” agreement [5]. This was taken to
mean that the use of the genes would contribute to build-
ing trust between the project and the public—because
they were sourced from a public institution. This seemed
straight forward until 2006, when the IRMA project man-
agement requested the University of Ottawa to enter into
an agreement with CIMMYT to enable the latter to com-
mercialize products generated by the project. At this point
it was established that the ownership of the different IPR
components was in the hands of many private companies,
which made it especially difficult for the university to pro-
vide a commercialization agreement without facing a
potential lawsuit over IPR violations [8]. Interviewees sta-
ted that the failure to disclose clearly the IPR status of the
technology by the University of Ottawa resulted in dimin-
ished trust between the university and the other partners.
At the onset of the project, interviewees indicated that the
partners engaged in the partnership informally without
signed agreements on the presumption that trust existed
among them. The agreements were regularized later by
making them legally binding. The informality of the initial
agreements may have contributed to the lack of clarity on
IPRs of the GM event from the University of Ottawa.
Lack of legal expertise
The late realization that the University of Ottawa did not
own the IPRs of the GM event, which was used in phase I
of the project, was partly attributed to the inadequate legal
advice from both CIMMYT and KARI, since the legal
experts from both institutions at the time had left [5].
Meticulous scrutiny of legal agreements to identify any
inadequacies that may result in diminished trust among
the partners and with the community is very important.
However, this requires access to legal expertise within the
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project; otherwise, time and resources will be wasted as
the project struggles to deal with legal challenges, includ-
ing those pertaining to IPRs.
3. Provide the public with balanced and accurate
information
Public access to balanced, accurate and timely informa-
tion about the new agricultural biotechnologies is neces-
sary for enhanced trust to exist between the project
partners and the public.
The benefits of early and continuous engagement of
stakeholders
In an effort to ensure stakeholders’ involvement in the
project planning and development, and in response to sta-
keholders’ request to be engaged all along the way, the
IRMA management held annual stakeholder meetings;
workshops; seminars; and hands-on training sessions with
the stakeholders. Other auxiliary activities included the
establishment of networks to enhance collaboration with
the stakeholders. For example, the Maize and Wheat
Working Group in Eastern and Central Africa, which is
run by the Association for Strengthening Agricultural
Research in Eastern and Central Africa (ASARECA), was
organized to address stakeholder issues—from research to
market—along the maize and wheat production value
chains. Through these networks the stakeholders along
the maize value chain were updated with IRMA activities,
which helped enhance trust in the project. These activities
were part of the project’s 10th theme: “Communication,
Promotion, Capacity Building, and Administration” [8].
The continuous engagement of different stakeholders
with messages tailor-made for them has been heralded as
one of the positive aspects of the IRMA project [19]. Early
involvement ensured ownership of and commitment to
the project and, in turn, built trust among the partners
and with the public [15]. Interviewees said that these
initiatives enabled expert information on any controversial
areas within the project to be passed on to stakeholders,
while providing a forum for interaction, feedback and
bonding among stakeholders. These activities helped
demystify the technology and allay fears surrounding agri-
cultural biotechnology, thus building trust among project
partners and with the community.
The challenge of early and continuous awareness creation
The downside of early and continuous engagement was
the high expectations that were formed by the stake-
holders but left unmet by the project. An interviewee from
CIMMYT acknowledged that the expectations of the sta-
keholders may have been raised too early in the project’s
life. We observed the challenge of maintaining a balance
between creating awareness among the stakeholders and
ensuring that the expectations of the stakeholders are rea-
sonable and not unwarranted. Considering that it takes 10
to 15 years or more to develop GM crops into end
products that can be delivered to the farmers [20], the
objective to deliver Bt-based varieties at the end of phase
II may have been unrealistic. In retrospect, the project
management suggested that it was inappropriate to raise
expectations about the project prematurely.
Awareness creation should be carefully done to ensure
that delayed product delivery neither negatively impacts
trust between the partners and the community nor leaves
the end users dissatisfied. This requires seeing the big
picture and integrating regular evaluation. It has been
reported that the peak of awareness creation and stake-
holder engagement should wait until the technology is
available and farmers are ready to plant [20,21].
Engaging with anti-GM lobbyists to build trust
Some of the engagement sessions in IRMA were open to
anti-GM lobbyists. At times during these sessions, the
anti-GM activists were engaged in one-on-one discussions
with the project management to clarify any inaccuracies;
however, this did not seem to change their position. In
some situations, anti-GM organizations took advantage of
cases of inadequate public awareness of GM crops to
spread negative and inaccurate views about health and
other perceived risks associated with the technology for
the sole purpose of fostering the public’s distrust in the
technology. In one particular instance reported by an
interviewee from CIMMYT, the anti-GM organizations
claimed that GM maize was sneaked into KARI-Kiboko
Research Centre, Kenya, which was also an IRMA trial site.
An interviewee from the seed industry attributed limited
public awareness partly to the scientists’ failure to ade-
quately engage and communicate with the public. He
emphasized the need for greater expertise in communica-
tions in order to reach the farmers with accurate informa-
tion on GM technology. An interviewee from CIMMYT
reported that IRMA’s limited communication with the
public was further undermined by the limited ability of the
project management to regularly update the public on
developments in the project due to funding cuts and the
departure of a communications specialist from the project.
An interviewee from KARI suggested that, to counter
any inaccuracies due to anti-GM lobbyists’ influencing
of public opinion, sufficient and accurate information
should be provided to the public, rather than having a
one-on-one engagement with such groups. This would
go a long way in addressing the challenge – since chan-
ging the attitude of anti-GM lobbyists is difficult.
4. Maximize synergy between the public and private
sector
Partners in agbiotech PPPs come from diverse back-
grounds and each has their own set of strengths to con-
tribute to the partnership. Capitalizing on the diversity
of the partners can help improve trust and the project’s
success.
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Individual and institutional differences between KARI and
CYMMYT
In a PPP, there is need for roles and responsibilities to
be clearly defined for the purpose of creating efficiency
and accountability [22]. In some instances this can
prove to be challenging, particularly when a partnership
cascades down to the community and seeks to engage
with members of the community – as was the case in
the IRMA project. At that level, coordinating mechan-
isms are required to ensure efficiency and accountability.
The differences between KARI and CIMMYT were
reported as having threatened project efficiency,
accountability and trust between the two public sector
institutions. The differences existed at both an indivi-
dual and institutional level. At the individual level, the
problem stemmed from competition for the position of
the project coordinator, while at the institutional level
there was a perception of inequality and favoritism
among the partners, with KARI feeling that they were
being treated as a junior partner. An interviewee from
KARI acknowledged that these differences created some
conflict.
The interviewees acknowledged that these apparent
sources of conflict were resolved over time by establish-
ing well-defined objectives and responsibilities and trans-
parent resource allocation, all of which served as an
opportunity for partners to be accountable to each other
and to the community. Accountability was partly linked
to the mutual pressure—referred to by an interviewee as
“peer pressure”—that the partners placed on each other
to fulfill their responsibilities. In general, however,
instead of competing interests on the part of the partners,
their expertise, roles and responsibilities were compli-
mentary and mutually reinforcing for the progress of the
project and led to a cordial relationship. This led to
enhanced trust and a “highly motivated team” [8], leading
to achievement of the project milestones. In addition,
agreement on the selection of a project coordinator for
the duration of the project gave the partners and their
staff a sense of stable leadership, which worked to build
trust.
The presence of a local public institution in the part-
nership also enhanced trust between the partners and the
public. This is because the local farming community
tends to identify with local public organizations, with
which they have built trust from previous engagements.
The involvement of such institutions as the face of the
project builds public confidence in the quality and safety
of the technologies offered by the partnership. Notwith-
standing earlier differences with KARI, an interviewee
from CIMMYT pointed out that partnering with KARI, a
local public research institution, boosted public accep-
tance of the process and expected products.
Apprehension about the private sector’s involvement in the
project
More often than not, distrust in agbiotech PPPs has
stemmed from the ownership of IPRs and usually occurs
between the private and public institutions [23]. This
may explain the public sector’s suspicions about the pri-
vate sector’s intentions in a PPP. The public sector part-
ners were apprehensive about the private sector’s
involvement in technology development even at the
beginning of the IRMA project, as they believed such
involvement could hamper public support and compli-
cate the funding principle, i.e., the public good of the
project.
Some were also of the view that the use of public genes
from the University of Ottawa would improve the pub-
lic’s trust in the project. However, according to an inter-
viewee from CIMMYT, when the public sector materials
sourced from the University of Ottawa were no longer
suitable for commercialization, CIMMYT had to turn to
a private sector GM event (MON810) [8] for the project
to progress into phase II. The private sector, although
seen as inspiring less trust, was deemed valuable in terms
of providing technological and skills support when the
public sector failed to deliver.
Irrespective of whether an institution is public or private,
there is a need for the institutions to find common ground
and converge on common interests in the partnership in
order to encourage a united focus in the project. Identify-
ing individual and institutional strengths and building
synergy between them, and tapping into the goodwill of
the local public institutions, is likely to contribute to
enhancing trust between the project and the community.
Conclusion
Africa is experiencing significant growth in the agbio-
tech field through PPPs. The IRMA PPP project is an
example of how the development of agbiotech products
in Africa entails several challenges to trust building and
how project management can address them and build
trust among the partners and with the community.
From this study there are at least four aspects that new
and ongoing agbiotech projects should put in place for
building trust: the partnership should ensure product
delivery; disclose fully and honestly all the necessary
information including IPRs ownership; share balanced
and accurate information with the stakeholders; and
maximize the synergy between the public and private
sectors.
Farmers in Kenya look forward to the IRMA project
to provide an affordable management solution for con-
trolling stem borers with less use of pesticides. Similarly,
agbiotech PPP projects in Africa should ensure delivery
of end products to the consumers to avoid breaking
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trust between the project and the community. While
they do so, they should also ensure that:
• Agreements are carefully scrutinized to eliminate any
loopholes and keep partners accountable for their end of
the bargain. This is necessary because agreements per se
may not be safeguards to trust between the partners;
• The partners carefully engage the public by provid-
ing accurate, balanced and timely information so as not
to raise unwarranted expectations that may become dif-
ficult to manage and;
• Partners should build synergy from the strengths of
the various public and private partners so that differ-
ences, instead of producing distrust, become cause for
trust building. This way trust will be sustained among
the partners and with the community.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Insect Resistant Maize for Africa core partners.
Additional file 2: Responsibilities of the IRMA core partners.
Additional file 3: Sample questions from the interview guide.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to each of the participants who contributed
substantial time and effort to this study. The authors also thank Hassan
Massum, Jessica Oh and Jennifer Deadman for comments on earlier drafts of
the manuscript.
This project was funded by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and
supported by the Sandra Rotman Centre, an academic centre at the
University Health Network and University of Toronto. The findings and
conclusions contained within are those of the authors and do not
necessarily reflect official positions or policies of the foundation.
This article has been published as part of Agriculture & Food Security Volume 1
Supplement 1, 2012: Fostering innovation through building trust: lessons from
agricultural biotechnology partnerships in Africa. The full contents of the
supplement are available online at http://www.agricultureandfoodsecurity.com/
supplements/1/S1. Publication of this supplement was funded by the Sandra
Rotman Centre at the University Health Network and the University of Toronto.
The supplement was devised by the Sandra Rotman Centre.
Author details
1Sandra Rotman Centre, University Health Network and University of
Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. 2African Centre for Innovation and
Leadership Development, Federal Capital Territory, Abuja, Nigeria. 3Dalla Lana
School of Public Health, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada.
Authors’ contributions
Study conception and design: OCE and JM. Data collection: JM and OCE.
Analysis and interpretation of data: JM and OCE. Draft of the manuscript: JM
and OCE. Critical revision of the manuscript for important intellectual
content: OCE and JM. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Published: 1 November 2012
References
1. Kioko A, Cereal Growers Association of Kenya: Maize production and
consumption in Kenya. 18th April 2012.
2. Owuor B: The Maize Subsector in Kenya: Mending the Granary: Survey
for the Heinrich Böll Foundation Regional Office for East & Horn of
Africa Nairobi, Kenya. 2010.
3. Integrated Approaches to Higher Maize Productivity in the New
Millennium. In Proceedings of the Seventh Eastern and Southern Africa
Regional Maize Conference: 11-15 February 2002; Nairobi, Kenya. CIMMYT
(International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center) and KARI (Kenya
Agricultural Research Institute);Friesen DK, Palmer AFE 2004:.
4. DeGroote H, Overholt W, Ouma JO, Mugo S: Assessing the potential
impact of Bt maize in Kenya using a GIS based model. Proceedings of the
International Agricultural Economics Conference: August 2003; Durban 2003.
5. Pest Control Products Board: List of registered pest control products for
use in Kenya. 2010.
6. Mugo S, Gichuki S: Taming Major Maize Field Pests in Kenya: The Role of
Biotechnology. Presentation to OFAB, Jacaranda Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya 30th
July 2009.
7. Khan Z, Midega C, Pittchar J, Pickett J, Bruce T: Push-pull technology: a
conservation agriculture approach for integrated management of insect
pests, weeds and soil health in Africa. International Journal of Agricultural
Sustainability 2011, 9(1):162-170.
8. KARI, CIMMYT: Insect Resistant Maize for Africa Annual Report 2006. 2006,
27:1-140.
9. Burgi J: Insect Resistant Maize: A case study of fighting the African stem
borer. Oxfordshire: CABI; 2009.
10. Syngenta Foundation: Development of Environmentally Safe, Insect
Resistant Maize Varieties for Food Security in Kenya. 2010, 1-17.
11. KARI, CIMMYT: Insect Resistant Maize for Africa (IRMA) Updates. 2002, 1-2: 1-6.
12. Mugo SJ, Gethi JO, Ouma S, Ajanga J, Beyene GM, Murenga M, Mulaa P,
Likhayo S, Gichuki V, Kega H, De Groote H, Chavangi A: Book of abstract of
the “Consolidating Experiences from IRMA I and II: Achievements,
Lessons and Prospects.”. Proceedings of the IRMA Project End-of-Phase II
Conference: 28-30 October 2008; Nairobi Safari Club Hotel, Nairobi, Kenya 2008.
13. International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre (CIMMYT). [http://
www.cimmyt.org/en/what-we-do/projects-by-region/insect-resistant-maize-
for-africa].
14. Spielman DJ, Grebmer K: Public–Private Partnerships in International
Agricultural Research: An Analysis of Constraints. Journal of Technology
Transfer 2006, 31:391-300.
15. Ezezika OC, Daar AS, Barber K, Mabeya J, Thomas F, Deadman J, Wang D,
Singer PA: Factors influencing agbiotech adoption and development in
sub-Saharan Africa. Nature Biotechnology 2012, 30:38-40.
16. Zheng J, Roehrich JK, Lewis MA: The dynamics of contractual and
relational governance: Evidence from long-term public-private
procurement arrangements. Journal of Purchasing and Supply Management
2008, 14:43-54.
17. Ezezika OC, Thomas F, Lavery JV, Daar AS, Singer PA: A Social Audit Model
for Agro-biotechnology Initiatives in Developing Countries: Accounting
for Ethical, Social, Cultural and Commercialization Issues. Journal of
Technology Management and Innovation 2009, 4(3):24-33.
18. Yin RK: Case study Research: Design and Methods. California: Sage
Publications;, 4 2003.
19. Wangalachi A, Poland D, Mugo S, Gichuki ST, Ouya D, Kimani G, Rabar J:
Experiences in effective communication on transgenic technology in
Africa – the case of the insect resistant maize for Africa (IRMA) project.
African Journal of Biotechnology 2011, 10(23):4694-4698.
20. Eicher CK, Maredia K, Sithole-Niang I: Biotechnology and the African
farmer. East Lansing MI: Department of Agricultural Economics, Michigan
State University; 2005.
21. Ezezika O, Mabeya J: How to engage with farmers over GM crops. SciDev
Net 2012, Opinion.
22. Barrett D, Austin J, McCarthy S: Cross-Sector Collaboration: Lessons from
the International Trachoma Initiative.Anonymous 9 Bow Street Cambridge,
Massachusetts 02138 USA 2000.
23. Spielman DJ, Hartwich F, Grebmer K: Public-Private Partnerships in
International Agricultural Research. International Food Policy Research
Institute; 2007, , 9: 1-6.
doi:10.1186/2048-7010-1-S1-S6
Cite this article as: Mabeya and Ezezika: Unfulfilled farmer expectations:
the case of the Insect Resistant Maize for Africa (IRMA) project
in Kenya. Agriculture & Food Security 2012 1(Suppl 1):S6.
Mabeya and Ezezika Agriculture & Food Security 2012, 1(Suppl 1):S6
http://www.agricultureandfoodsecurity.com/content/1/S1/S6
Page 7 of 7
